ACTIVE SHOOTER GUIDELINES
FOR PLACES OF MASS GATHERING
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Introduction

Places of mass gathering (PMG) can pose a broad range of security challenges for their owners and operators. They have been specifically identified—both nationally and internationally—as attractive targets for religious and political extremists, as well as disgruntled or mentally impaired individuals. Armed offender attacks have occurred and continue to occur in crowded places such as sporting, transport and entertainment venues. Government and private sector stakeholders must work cooperatively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of such incidents.

These guidelines are intended to increase understanding of the threat that active shooter incidents pose to PMG. In particular, they seek to illustrate the key role that private sector stakeholders can play in developing and implementing appropriately informed prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements to reduce the risks posed by such a threat. The guidance material has been developed by the Mass Gatherings Advisory Group on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), with input from the Mass Gatherings Business Advisory Group. It should be read in conjunction with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee’s National Guidelines for the Protection of Places of Mass Gathering from Terrorism (2011).

Purpose

These guidelines aim to increase stakeholder awareness of this particular type of dynamic threat, while also providing guidance on the issues and options that may be considered during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. The National Guidelines (2011) set out several broad guiding principles that public and private sector stakeholders should consider to reduce their vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. These active shooter guidelines aim to supplement and build upon some of those broad areas of focus, with particular emphasis on the following two principles:

- Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach.
- Security arrangements for places of mass gathering should account for the dynamic nature of the threat and be responsive to changes in the security environment.

Gaining a better understanding of the risk environment and options for preventing and dealing with active shooter incidents will enable private sector stakeholders to more effectively contribute to the collective national efforts to manage this threat to PMG. It is intended that this knowledge will lead to the development of ‘contingency’ or sub-plans that will supplement existing emergency response plans and arrangements at facilities and venues.
# Glossary of terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active shooter:</strong></td>
<td>A person armed with a firearm(s) who is actively engaged in killing or attempting to cause serious harm to multiple people in a populated location.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency management:</strong></td>
<td>The plans, structures and arrangements that are established to bring together government, voluntary and private agencies in a coordinated way to deal with emergency needs, including prevention, response and recovery.</td>
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<td><strong>Evacuation:</strong></td>
<td>The process of relocating people from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas to safer areas. The purpose of an evacuation is to use distance to separate people from the danger created by the emergency.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mitigation:</strong></td>
<td>Measures taken before, during, or after a disaster (emergency) to decrease or eliminate its impact on society (people) and the environment (places).</td>
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<td><strong>Places of mass gathering (PMG):</strong></td>
<td>Are characterised by having a large concentration of people on a predictable basis, and include a diverse range of facilities and sites such as sporting venues, shopping/business precincts, public transport hubs and tourism/entertainment venues.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Police first responder:</strong></td>
<td>The general-duties, uniformed police that often provide the initial policing response to calls for police assistance.</td>
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<td><strong>Police Tactical Group (PTG):</strong></td>
<td>A highly trained police unit that tactically manages and resolves high-risk incidents, including terrorist incidents.</td>
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<td><strong>Rapid deployment:</strong></td>
<td>The swift and immediate deployment of emergency services personnel to an ongoing situation where delayed deployment could result in serious injury or death.</td>
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<td><strong>Situational awareness:</strong></td>
<td>The ability to quickly recognise and interpret an event, make sound decisions based on those interpretations, and establish early, effective and continuous lines of communication between the incident site and the controlling agency in order to provide ongoing accurate information about the situation to responders.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorist act:</strong></td>
<td>An act or threat committed with the intention of advancing a political, ideological or religious cause, and which is intended to coerce or intimidate an Australian government, a foreign government, or sections of the public, which causes serious physical harm or death to a person, endangers a person’s life, causes serious damage to property, creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public, or seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system.</td>
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Threat context

Terrorist propaganda continues to promote the efficacy of ‘stand-alone’ attacks, encouraging individuals, particularly those based in Western countries, to conduct attacks at home rather than travelling to conflict zones. The bombings that occurred in Boston on the afternoon of 15 April 2013, close to the finish line of the Boston Marathon, demonstrate the threat this type of ‘home-grown’ terrorism poses to PMG.

The Anders Breivik attack in Norway in July 2011 demonstrates that terrorist attacks can occur without forewarning and security services cannot guarantee visibility of all terrorist attack planning. It is also a reminder that although al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and Islamist extremists supportive of its ideology continue to pose a significant threat to Australia, attacks may also be inspired by a non-Islamist ideology and be driven by local issues.

Notwithstanding the threat posed by improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, international experience indicates that firearm attacks continue to be one of the more common strategies adopted by violent extremists, particularly in Western countries where firearms are often readily accessible. Within the Australian context, while access to firearms is well regulated in comparison, their use is still considered to be one of the most likely methods of attack.

Historically, Australia and New Zealand have not been immune from active shooter events. Several significant incidents have occurred at government buildings, shopping centres, universities and public spaces over the past 25 years. The Port Arthur, Hoddle Street, Strathfield, and Queen Street incidents in particular demonstrate that active shooter mass casualty attacks in Australia remain a real and persistent threat to the community.

In August 2009, police arrested four men in association with a terrorist plot targeting the Holsworthy Army Barracks in NSW, where several Australian Defence Force units involved in overseas deployments are based. The perpetrators planned to infiltrate the barracks and shoot as many people as possible.

These guidelines provide specific advice on the active shooter threat. Guidance material on the threat posed by IEDs will form the basis of a separate set of ANZCTC guidelines.

The current security context assessment is contained at Appendix A.

Characteristics of active shooter incidents

The typical active shooter will attempt to kill as many people as possible within a short period of time. This is why they generally target places where they can achieve the greatest impact—i.e. crowded places. The rapid development of active shooter incidents often means the police first responders will be uniformed, general-duties police.

An active shooter incident does not generally include a hostage situation, but can potentially transition into one, particularly during the resolution phase.

General features

Research to-date has not identified any significant trends regarding active shooter incidents, particularly in the Australian – New Zealand context. In fact, most incidents vary greatly from one attack to another. The following general features, however, are common elements of active shooter incidents:

- Incidents often occur in confined or controlled areas of high target concentration.
- Incidents often involve ‘soft targets’ such as shopping centres, schools and other PMG.
- Most incidents evolve rapidly and are often over within 10-15 minutes.
- Many active shooters will continue to attempt to harm victims until confronted by law enforcement personnel or another type of intervention, or they commit suicide.
Most incidents are generally not resolved through negotiation or other peaceful means.

**Weapons**

Historically, Australian active shooter incidents have involved the use of long arm weapons (rifles and shotguns) although the use of handguns has become more prominent over the past ten years. Firearm ownership restrictions introduced by the government following the Port Arthur massacre significantly reduced the number of semi-automatic weapons in the community. Each year, however, many firearms are stolen from licensed firearm owners and could potentially fall into the wrong hands. Potential active shooters may therefore be able to access a wide variety of firearms, either legitimately or through criminal activities or connections.

**Primary objectives**

In most incidents, active shooters need freedom of movement and ready access to victims in order to achieve their objective. Therefore, *minimising the offender’s access to potential victims* should be the primary objective of any plans or strategies. This is most likely to be achieved through the following activities:

- initiating immediate response activities
- minimising the duration of the incident
- restricting the offender’s movements
- moving people from danger
- preventing people from entering the scene
- helping police to locate and contain the shooter.

**TIME + FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT = INCREASED CASUALTIES**

Australia’s strategic approach to counter-terrorism recognises the need to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover (PPRR) from terrorist acts. The PPRR concept does not represent a consecutive set of activities and many elements of PPRR will often occur concurrently. Owners and operators of PMG and event organisers are strongly encouraged to ensure their own prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements and activities align with those of emergency service agencies. The following sections provide guidance and considerations on how to achieve this, particularly in relation to active shooter situations.

**Prevention**

Not all risks or emergencies can be prevented, so the concept of prevention needs to have a much broader meaning, and should encompass activities that may reduce the severity or impact of the emergency event. General prevention-related activities can include gathering and analysing intelligence, developing strategies to reduce the impact on life/property and identifying or eliminating vulnerabilities at potential target sites. For most types of hostile attacks, prevention activities should aim to:

- deter a would-be attacker – by providing physical and electronic security measures, coupled with good management practices
- detect an intrusion – by providing alarm and visual detection/recording systems
- delay or limit the intrusion for a sufficient period to allow a response force to attend – by putting in place physical security measures.

For active shooter attacks, additional prevention-related activities (specifically aimed at mitigating or reducing the severity of the incident) should also be considered. The main focus of those activities should be on restricting the movement of the offender/s while reducing their access to further victims. How to achieve this will depend on many variables, such as the physical design and security features of the venue, the movement of the offender and the opportunities for escape.

Not all venues and events will share the same risk profile or have similar vulnerabilities, so the principle of ‘proportionality’ should generally be applied to any prevention-related activities. This means that protective security measures not only need to be proportionate to the level of assessed risk, but should also try to strike a balance between the threat to public safety and the protection of civil liberties. However, when measuring proportionality...
it should be recognised that prevention and mitigation activities related to a specific threat may also provide broader crime prevention and public safety benefits.

## Preparedness

Activities associated with preparedness include emergency planning, resourcing, capability development and testing of preparedness arrangements. These arrangements and activities are generally focused on known or expected incidents, threats or emergency events. However, for generally unexpected and dynamic events, such as active shooter incidents, PMG owners and operators should adopt a ‘contingency planning’ approach.

### Contingency planning

The aim of contingency planning is to counter emerging threats and respond when unexpected situations arise. Contingency plans generally supplement or complement general emergency response plans and arrangements, and are often designed as sub-plans. Some of the basic features of contingency plans are outlined below.

**Combined and coordinated management:** Contingency plans should be based on a multi-stakeholder approach. They should consider and, where possible, integrate existing venue procedures and local emergency response plans and arrangements.

**Assessment:** Factors to consider when designing contingency plans include the characteristics of the location and the potential consequences of an attack at that location. Information and intelligence relevant to the likelihood of a particular target being subject to that type of threat should also be considered during the risk assessment process.

**Response:** Contingency plans should provide a range of options and scenarios to deal with specific issues. There is no one model to respond to every emergency, so responses need to be flexible and varied according to the nature and effects of the crisis. However there are some common objectives that characterise most emergency responses.

These include:

1. saving and protecting life
2. facilitating the evacuation of those at risk
3. containing the incident or threat
4. supporting emergency response and investigation activities.

Contingency plans should form part of overall emergency planning and briefing arrangements. All emergency plans should be tested and reviewed on a regular basis to ensure they are well understood, contemporary and effective.

Guidance for initial response considerations for venue management is contained at Appendix B.

## Initial response

Because of the dynamic and unpredictable nature of active shooter incidents there is no best practice or recommended response action that PMG owners and operators can build into their plans, arrangements and training activities. As previously mentioned, the primary objective of any initial response planning should be to minimise the offender’s access to victims. Therefore owners and operators should develop and practise strategies aimed at evacuating or isolating people or the offender. The US Department of Homeland Security has developed an Active Shooter: How to Respond guide that is widely used internationally and outlines three key areas of focus.
**Evacuate:** Building occupants should evacuate the facility if safe to do so. Evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualise their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators. Maintaining concealment or cover while moving is also important.

**Hide:** If safely evacuating the venue is not possible, occupants should seek to hide in a secure area where they can lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, cover all windows, turn off all lights and remain silent. Mobile phones should also be turned to silent.

**Take action:** If the option of hiding in place is adopted, individuals may also need to consider options to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter in the event they are located. This can include using or throwing available objects or using aggressive force when confronted. Such action should only be taken as a last resort and in order to protect the life of the individual or others in that area.

**Transition considerations**

Responsibility for implementing and coordinating initial response activities will, in most instances, be assumed by the venue/facility management or security staff until emergency responders are able to take over that responsibility. A critical aspect of managing that response and transitioning responsibility will be the ability to gain ‘situational awareness’. Establishing early, effective and continuous lines of communication from the incident site to the responding police agency will be critical in order to accurately inform them of the present situation and its subsequent development. Knowing or understanding the expectations of law enforcement responders will also enable a more effective transition of incident control. Planning and staff capability/training activities should include:

- developing strategies that allow designated staff to safely maintain situational awareness of the incident and relay any new information to police first responders
- training staff and occupants in how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene.

The preferred response when police arrive may vary slightly across Australian states and territories, so PMG owners and operators should consult with local law enforcement agencies when developing their plans.

Guidance for initial response considerations for affected staff and occupants is contained at Appendix C.

**Police response**

Each jurisdiction has systems and inter-agency arrangements that provide the basis for emergency management and critical incident response. These procedures and arrangements have been tailored to meet the specific needs, capacities and capabilities in each jurisdiction’s operating environment. Commonalities across Australian and New Zealand police jurisdictions include:

- operational response strategies, including incident and emergency management models
- a use of force model supported by operational principles, skills and tactics training.

Despite many similarities, there remain a number of differences in emergency management arrangements, processes and terminology across the states and territories. It is therefore critical that PMG and major event stakeholders develop a firm understanding of the emergency service plans and arrangements that apply to the jurisdiction that they are operating in.

Due to the dynamic nature of active shooter incidents, highly trained and equipped police tactical group operators may be unable to respond to a scene in a timely manner. As such, uniformed, general-duties police officers will generally respond to most active shooter situations and potentially manage them to their conclusion.
While the specific tactics, policies and training of police first responders may vary across jurisdictions, it is expected that the following objectives will guide their initial response activities.

**Mission**: The main objective of the police first responders in an active shooter incident is to save lives and prevent further loss of life or injuries. This will generally be achieved through a rapid deployment strategy.

The focus of a rapid deployment strategy should be to reduce or suppress the threat posed by the active shooter as quickly as possible. Traditional cordon, contain and negotiate strategies are unlikely to be effective in reducing the time a shooter has to achieve their desired outcomes, or limiting their freedom of movement. The most appropriate response to an active shooter incident will also depend on other factors, including available police resources, the incident setting and the tactics or weapons involved.

**Locate and isolate**: Once the decision to rapidly deploy has been made, the focus will generally be on how to reduce the offender’s area of operation and access to potential victims. This is best achieved by quickly locating the offender and containing the threat. To achieve this, first responders may initially need to keep moving past casualties and panicked people to try and contain the threat as quickly as possible.

**Command and control**: Any response to a major emergency or incident should be managed by an appropriate command, control and coordination structure. In active shooter situations, however, this might not be achievable in the first instance as it may delay any rapid deployment activities. The need to establish effective command and control of the incident, including coordination with venue management, may therefore become a secondary priority that is delegated to other responding units.

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**Recovery**

To ensure a smooth transition from response to recovery, arrangements that commenced during response should be gradually devolved and integrated. This will include aspects such as media and information management, impact assessment, rehabilitation of the built environment and restoring community and staff confidence. While many recovery-related matters will be similar for the majority of emergency events, significant or traumatic events such as terrorist acts or active shooter incidents may add extra complexity to normal recovery procedures.

Key recovery considerations following an active shooter incident may include:
- public information and community confidence
- scene preservation and investigation activities
- business continuity challenges.

**Public information**

Media or public information activities must support operational policies and actions. To achieve this, public messaging should be developed in coordination with the relevant operational and media/public relations managers. This is particularly important in situations where an offender has been taken into custody or charged with offences relating to the incident, as issues of sub-judice may arise. Information should be provided regularly to keep the public informed and should only be restricted in the interests of safety and/or operational security. Information issues relating to consequence management, such as providing assistance to victims, should be clearly identified as separate from the actual incident or security issue. As a general rule:
- an agency must only release information for which it has responsibility
- a log of all public information activities and decisions should be maintained.
The National Security Public Information Guidelines provide a framework for the Australian Government and state and territory agencies relating to national security issues and incidents. They are available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.

Crime scene and investigation activities

Police will conduct some form of major investigation for all active shooter incidents. This could involve criminal and forensic investigations in relation to potential criminal offences (including acts of terrorism), as well as coronial investigations on behalf of the coroner. These investigation processes will need to be extremely thorough and may often be protracted, particularly where the incident has occurred over a broad geographical area, or involves significant forensic challenges. During the investigation phase the police may also seek assistance from management at the location to help identify potential sources of evidence or witnesses. This could include CCTV footage, and radio, telephone or decision-making logs. Recovery or business continuity plans should identify a suitable liaison officer that can work with the police to help facilitate these types of requests.

Business continuity

How quickly and painlessly owners and operators return to business-as-usual following a terrorist attack or other disaster depends on how effectively they can devise and implement their business continuity management arrangements. Through their contact with investigating police, the nominated liaison officer will generally be in a position to obtain information about the likely duration of the scene examination, allowing the venue to start implementing their business continuity arrangements. While the actual process may not change significantly, the amount of time it takes often will.

Useful links

Australian national security: www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

Australian emergency management: www.em.gov.au

ASIO Business Liaison Unit: www.blu.asio.gov.au


UNICRI (United Nations): www.unicri.it/lab

Version control

This document is endorsed by the Australia-New Zealand National Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) and maintained by the National Security Resilience Policy Division (NSRPD) of the Attorney-General’s Department.

The Attorney-General’s Department is responsible for the version control of this document.

To preserve the integrity and currency of this document:

- major amendments must be endorsed by the ANZCTC
- minor amendments, for example to correct spelling or grammar, should be documented and forwarded to the NSRPD to be implemented and then a revised version sent to the Mass Gatherings Advisory Group (MGAG) to be endorsed before it is distributed.
Appendix A

Current security context

The main terrorist threat to Australia emanates from al-Qa’ida (AQ) and Islamist terrorists inspired by AQ’s world view. The public statements of AQ figures and other extremists continue to criticise Australia, and identify Australians and Australian interests as legitimate targets.

Despite international counter-terrorism efforts, AQ retains the intent and capability to conduct terrorist attacks and to operationally influence like-minded terrorist networks to undertake attacks. The threat to Australian interests domestically and overseas from AQ like-minded groups will endure for the foreseeable future.

Critical infrastructure and places of mass gathering feature prominently in terrorist attacks linked to AQ and its affiliates—characterised by their symbolic nature, concentration of people in enclosed spaces and economic and social importance. Terrorist attacks have targeted government buildings, diplomatic and consular offices, commercial buildings including hotels and other tourist facilities, residential compounds, commercial and military shipping, aviation, oil and other energy and transport infrastructure. The aviation sector remains a particular focus for AQ and its affiliates.

AQ and like-minded terrorists have considered, trained for and attempted a range of attack methodologies, including using improvise explosive devices (IEDs), armed assault, or a combination of such tactics. IEDs have been used in suicide attacks and remote detonations, and have been used with a variety of delivery vectors, including persons, cars, trucks and boats.

Terrorist attacks often feature opportunistic weapon selection dependent upon the perpetrator’s access. In some instances terrorists have undertaken reconnaissance or surveillance of targets when planning attacks.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

November 2012
Appendix B

Firearm attack - initial action advice for management

Response priorities: During an active shooter incident the primary response objectives and the potential actions for achieving them may include:

1. Saving and protecting life
   a. Appoint an incident manager to coordinate activities until police arrive.
   b. Use the built environment to restrict or deny access.
   c. Commence CCTV surveillance and track the offender(s).
   d. Communicate appropriate cover and concealment options to those present.
   e. Identify and establish a safe medical triage/first aid location.
   f. Restrict further vehicle access to the site (bollards, gates, road closures, etc).
   g. Restrict physical access to the site or general vicinity.

2. Facilitating the evacuation of those at risk
   a. Notify key staff of the incident through prearranged messages/codes and methods.
   b. Appoint an evacuation manager and ensure they have situational awareness.
   c. Provide guidance on safe routes for those that are self-evacuating.
   d. Assess the suitability and potential safety of normal evacuation routes.
   e. Evaluate the safety of standing evacuation muster points and change if necessary.
   f. Identify potential safe places or strong holds for those unable to evacuate.

3. Containing the incident or threat
   a. Consider using electronic or mechanical isolation systems to constrain the movement of the offender or restrict access to potential victims.
   b. Identify and establish a perimeter.
   c. Use the existing built environment to best advantage for safety and containment action.
   d. Consider restricting escape options for the offender if these may endanger others.

4. Supporting emergency response and investigation activities
   a. Identify and communicate safe access routes/form up points for emergency services.
   b. Consider using CCTV and other remote methods where possible.
   c. Commence incident and decision-making logs.
   d. Nominate a suitable emergency services liaison officer to meet/brief the police.
   e. Ensure access to site plans and CCTV footage (where possible).
   f. Clearly identify when incident management has transitioned to the police.
   g. Provide ongoing support to the emergency response action as requested.

It is important to regularly practise these and any additional initial response activities so that key managers and staff clearly understand the priority actions and are able to perform these actions in a high-stress and dynamic environment.
Appendix C

Firearm attack - initial action advice for individuals

Attacks involving firearms may be infrequent but it is important to be prepared to respond to such an incident. The advice below will help with planning a response.

ESCAPE

Under immediate gunfire – Take cover initially, but attempt to leave the area as soon as possible if safe to do so. Try to confirm that your escape route is safe.

Nearby gunfire - Leave the area immediately, moving away from the gunfire if this can be achieved safely.

• Leave your belongings behind.
• Do not congregate at evacuation points.
• Try to maintain cover (see below).

Cover from gunfire
• substantial brickwork or concrete walls
• engine blocks of motor vehicles
• base of large live trees
• earth banks/hills/mounds

Cover from view
• internal partition
• car doors
• wooden fences
• curtains

SEE

The more information you can pass on to police the better, but NEVER risk your own safety or that of others to gain it.

If it is safe to do so, think about obtaining the following information:

• details of any firearms being used or possessed
• exact location of the incident
• whether the perpetrator is stationary or moving in any particular direction
• number of casualties
• number of other people in the area
• number and description of offenders
• their motives or intent (if known or apparent)
• what else they are carrying.

TELL

• Ring police immediately on 000 and give them the information shown under ‘See’.
• Stay on the line and provide any other information or updates the operator requests (if safe to do so).
• Use all the channels of communication available to you to inform staff, visitors, neighbouring premises, etc of the danger.

IF YOU CAN’T ESCAPE...

ACT

• Secure your immediate environment and other vulnerable areas.
• Keep people out of public areas, such as corridors and foyers.
• Consider locking/barricading yourself and others in a room or secure area.
• Try to choose a room where escape to a more secure area may be possible.
• Move away from the door, remain quiet and stay there until told otherwise by appropriate authorities, or you need to move for safety reasons.
• Silence mobile phones and other devices that may identify your presence.

• Consider (only as a last resort) options for arming yourself with improvised weapons to defend yourself if you are located.

Police response

In an attack involving firearms a police officer’s priority is to protect lives. In an active shooter scenario, this usually means locating the offender as quickly as possible, even if it means initially moving past people who need help.

Please remember:

• At first police officers may not be able to distinguish you from the gunman.

• Police officers may be armed and could point guns in your direction.

• They may initially move past you in search of the gunman.

• Avoid quick movements or shouting and keep your hands in view.

• Promptly follow any instructions given.

Be aware that police may enter your location at some stage to secure the building and locate people that have hidden from the threat.
In the case of an emergency, dial 000. For all other enquiries, contact your local police jurisdiction:

**ACT Policing**
Emergency Management and Planning
(02) 6256 7777
ACT-EM&P@afp.gov.au

**New South Wales Police**
Counter Terrorist Business Contact Unit
(02) 9919 9278
bcu@police.nsw.gov.au

**Northern Territory Police**
131 444 (in NT)
Ctsecurity@nt.gov.au

**Queensland Police**
Intelligence, CT & Major Events Command
(07) 3406 3670
Counter.Terrorism@police.qld.gov.au

**South Australia Police**
Critical Infrastructure Support Group
(08) 7322 3622
sapol.sacis@police.sa.gov.au

**Tasmania Police**
Special Response and Counter-Terrorism Unit
(03) 623 02500
SRCTU@police.tas.gov.au

**Victoria Police**
Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit
(03) 9247 6666
CTCU-INFO-OIC@police.vic.gov.au

**Western Australia Police**
Counter-Terrorism & Emergency Response
(08) 9370 7287
cr&er@police.wa.gov.au